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Standard law and economics theory relies on the assumption that human beings act as ideal rational decision
makers. However, significant psychological research has undermined the view that individuals act completely rationally.
The authors detail a recent approach to the human mind known as “embodied cognition”, which maintains that mental
processes are grounded in actual bodily states. This link between the mind and body is not captured in the standard view
of the rational human. Studying the mind in relation to the body can help us better understand and predict seemingly ir-
rational actions.
The authors describe the precursors to the embodied cognition movement, and note that although embodied cognition
is similar to earlier approaches that considered heuristics, it offers a more complete theory of human behaviour. They
use embodied cognition as the basis for an expanded notion of embodied rationality that goes beyond the domain of af-
fect and actions into the domain of judgments. The concept of embodied rationality can be applied to reasoning and de-
cision-making processes central to Behavioural Law and Economics. In particular, the authors suggest that it can en-
hance our understanding of decisions involving risk and time, decisions about oneself, and judgments about others.
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Introduction
The rational human is neither rational nor human. Law, economics, and law and economics must come to terms with
these two important qualities of this celebrated figure. The first quality has already been acknowledged: the rational hu-
man is, by many standard definitions, not *119 rational. It is well-established that people fail to reason according to the
formal rules of probability, statistics and logic. [FN1] The second quality is just now being acknowledged, or rather, re-
acknowledged, in the psychology literature: the rational human is, in fact, not human. The way the human mind thinks
and reasons is not independent of the human body in which it resides.
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In this paper, we describe an approach to Behavioural Law and Economics that we call “embodied rationality”. The
term is borrowed from the current movement in cognitive science called “embodied cognition”. Embodied cognition re-
minds us that human cognitive processes take place in the human body; more specifically it points out (a) that many cog-
nitive processes serve the broader goal of facilitating action in a specific environment and (b) that cognition is grounded
in actual bodily states.
Research supporting the notion of embodied cognition comes from cognitive psychologists studying perception, cog-
nition, action and language, from social psychologists studying emotion, from comparative psychologists studying anim-
al behaviour, and from neuroscientists studying the human brain. Here are some brief illustrations:
*120 • People perceive hills to be steeper when wearing heavy backpacks than when wearing lighter ones;
[FN2]
• People who are asked to describe an animated cartoon and are prevented from gesturing have more diffi-
culty in describing spatial elements than people who are allowed to gesture; [FN3]
• When responding to words on screen, people are faster to indicate that the word is positive by pulling a
lever toward them and negative by pushing a lever away from them than when they use the opposite response pat-
tern; [FN4]
• When holding a cup containing a hot drink, people are more likely to rate another person as warm and
friendly than when holding a cup containing a cold drink. [FN5]
Each of these findings suggests that there is a tie between the body and the brain--the physical and the mental--that is
not captured in the standard view of the rational human. Part I of the paper gives a rough history of various movements
in psychology that are relevant to the development of this view. Part II visits the modern history of “rationality” and then
situates embodied cognition in relation to other recent movements in psychology, economics and law. Part III describes
some of the findings of embodied cognition in more depth. Part IV expands the notion of “embodied cognition” to
“embodied rationality” and describes some preliminary ideas about how embodied rationality could be relevant to law.
Part V concludes.
*121 I. A Selective History of Psychology
The notion of embodied cognition has roots that go way back into the (mercifully short) history of scientific psycho-
logy. However, its current incarnation is rightly viewed as revolutionary because it stands in sharp contrast to cognitiv-
ism--the current dominant paradigm. The story that follows is a selective and somewhat idiosyncratic history of scientific
psychology-- focusing on research in thinking, reasoning, judgment and decision making--that is designed to highlight
themes and issues that help situate the embodied cognition movement. A rough timeline of these developments is
provided as an Appendix.
A. Physiological Psychology
The history of scientific psychology often begins with an important bit of pre-history: the work of the physiological
psychologists in Europe in the mid-1800s. These researchers systematically studied human physiological responses to
various types of stimuli. Most important for our purposes, Ernst Heinrich Weber discovered the idea of the
“just-noticeable-difference”--the minimum difference between two stimuli that humans can detect. For example, if you
35 QUEENLJ 117 Page 3
35 Queen's L.J. 117
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
hold your hands out with the palms up and someone places a 25 gram envelope on one hand and a 50 gram envelope on
the other, you will be able to detect which envelope needs extra postage. However, if someone places a 2000 gram pack-
age on one hand and a 2025 gram package on the other, you will not be able to discern which is heavier. Weber found
that this discriminable difference, the “just-noticeable-difference”, was a function of the size of the smaller stimulus (or
“standard”). As the standard gets heavier, you need a bigger difference between the weights to discriminate between
them. Weber found that this function held for many judgments involving physiological processes (judgments of weight,
brightness, loudness, distance, size, etc.). [FN6] Later in the 19th century, *122 Gustav Fechner, first independently and
then jointly with Weber, expanded and refined the idea. Fechner recognized that there was not a one-to-one relationship
between the objective increase in the intensity of a stimulus and the subjective increase in the sensation caused by that
stimulus. So, for example, one car horn is loud and two are louder--but together they do not seem twice as loud as a
single horn--and the twentieth horn adds very little to our sensation of the noise that was produced by a mere nineteen.
The Weber-Fechner law describes the logarithmic relationship between the intensity of a sensation and the intensity of
the stimulus, and it holds across many types of stimuli. [FN7]
B. Introspectionism and Behaviourism
If the work of the physiological psychologists is thought of as prehistory, the title of founder of “The First Scientific
Psychology Laboratory” usually goes to Wilhelm Wundt. [FN8] Wundt and others wanted to examine the contents of
consciousness and the building blocks of experience. In one line of experimentation, trained observers would be shown a
stimulus--an object, colour or word--and respond with a single word. Later experimentalists in the Wurzburg school
asked their subjects to report what thought processes they had had between the presentation of a stimulus and their word
response. [FN9] In subsequent years, different laboratories, with experimental subjects instructed in different ways, con-
cluded different things about the form and contents of thought and conscious experience.
These conflicting and non-replicable results reached by various laboratories led to the rise of a new school of psycho-
logy in the United States. John B. Watson, [FN10] one of the founders of the behaviourist school, called for a more
“objective” psychology, the elimination of theorizing about unobservable responses like the experience of a “mental im-
age”, and an understanding of human behaviour in terms of learning and *123 conditioning. [FN11] For the behaviour-
ists, the data upon which science stood needed to be publicly observable and verifiable. When current cognitive psycho-
logy textbooks characterize (or, perhaps, caricaturize) the behaviourist movement, they state that it banished any theoriz-
ing about how the mind works and relegated mental processing to a black box. One could observe the stimulus (for ex-
ample, a mother calling a name) and the response (for example, the child running towards her), but all this would mean is
that such a stimulus-response pairing had been rewarded in the past and so the actions would continue to be paired in the
future. One should make no guesses as to the thoughts, motivations, knowledge or beliefs of the actors.
Behaviourism proved very successful at some things but failed greatly at explaining complex human behaviour. As
the World War II and postwar generations of psychologists wanted to understand and explain why humans behaved as
they did (and how to change or optimize it), they were forced to re-examine the prohibition on theorizing about the unob-
servable human mind. [FN12]
C. The Cognitive Revolution
Thus, many psychologists from the mid-to-late twentieth century celebrated the “cognitive revolution” that over-
turned behaviourism. As described below, the cognitive revolution freed researchers to say that they were studying the
human mind--not just human physiology and not just human behaviour. An important component of the revolution was
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the computer metaphor of mind. Just as in a computer it makes sense to study the hardware and software independently,
so too in *124 humans it makes sense to study the brain (hardware) and mind (software) independently.
An important framework for guiding what cognitive science was doing was provided by David Marr. He argued that
understanding a complex system, cognitive or otherwise, took three levels of analysis. At the computational level are the
goals of the system and the constraints on that system; at the algorithmic level are the strategies that are used; and at the
implementation/hardware level is the physical embodiment of that system. Consider a commonly used example: to un-
derstand the game of chess you need to understand the goals (computational), the moves (algorithmic) and what piece
each object in front of you represents (implementation). But we all know that a game of chess is the “same” whether the
chessmen are carved of ebony and ivory, are Renaissance actors donned in bishops robes and astride horses, or are mere
thoughts in an expert's head. And we all know that a computer's software is fair game for study and analysis. Thus, re-
searchers were free to study (unobservable) cognitive processes--the algorithmic level (or software)-- without worrying
whether those algorithms were instantiated in a computer's hardware or the brain's wetware. [FN13] Some even thought
that if a computer were “fed” an enormous number of facts comparable to the number of facts that the human brain con-
tains, it would eventually “cross over” and think and understand like a human brain.
But not everyone agreed with that characterization. For example, in his famous “Chinese Room” thought experiment,
[FN14] the philosopherturned-cognitive-scientist*125 John Searle argued that what computers do while computing is not
a good analogy for what humans do while thinking because computers do not “understand”. And researchers in memory
have long noted that “human memory is not like a computer memory”, citing the many differences in what happens to in-
formation as it is stored and retrieved from those very different memories. [FN15]
However, the computer/information processing metaphor not only dominated thinking about thinking for many years,
but has also been embraced by current popular culture and appears in common phrases such as: “I need more input”; “I
can't process all of that information”; and “doesn't compute”.
D. Embodied Cognition
Embodied cognition is partly a reaction to this movement. It is a recognition that understanding the human cognitive
system requires understanding that the mind/software is embodied not only in the brain/hardware but also is functioning
in concert with the rest of the human body. It has been a struggle to move theorizing about thinking “backwards” from
the realm of pure disembodied thought of guillotinestyle cognitivism back to grappling with its physical instantiation. To
even more fully appreciate the emergence of the embodied cognition framework, we next position it within what we
might call the *126 “rationality wars” and the resulting panoply of recent intellectual movements in psychology.
II. The Rationality Wars
A. Classic Rationality and Classic Irrationality
In retrospect, cognitive (or social) psychologists of the mid-twentieth century seem to have been very optimistic.
Venturing into new lines of psychological inquiry, they discovered the “rational” person and claimed that humans were
intuitive statisticians [FN16] and intuitive scientists. [FN17]
The celebration of human rationality, however, was not long-lived. The 1970s brought the publication of the early
classic irrationality findings. In their influential Science article, [FN18] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman docu-
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mented many types of human reasoning errors--deviations from normative reasoning in probability, statistics and logic.
Tversky and Kahneman described many of these systematic errors as resulting from built-in reasoning biases and from
the use of heuristics, which typically allow people to easily reach the correct answer but provide a potentially error-prone
process. Tversky and Kahneman christened the “big three heuristics”-- representativeness, availability and anchoring-
-and pointed out several others. The 1970s gave us some other classic big ones, such as the hindsight bias. [FN19] In
general, Tversky *127 and Kahneman were not pessimistic about errors generated by heuristics, but they did have a pess-
imistic tone about what people eventually come to know:
It is not surprising that useful heuristics such as availability are retained, even though they occasionally lead to errors
in prediction or estimation. What is perhaps surprising is the failure of people to infer from lifelong experience such fun-
damental statistical rules as regression toward the mean, or the effect of sample size on sampling variability. [FN20]
B. The Reign of Heuristics and Biases
But then came the deluge. In the 1980s and 1990s, finding new heuristics and biases became a cottage industry.
Every cognitive and social psychologist worth his or her salt discovered and named a new one. Furthermore, most of
these discoveries did not come with the comforting words that they were useful and “usually” got people to the right an-
swer; rather, the spirit of many articles and chapters seemed to be that “people are dumb” [FN21] and “I'm just clever
enough to show you another way that people are dumb.” [FN22]
*128 C. The Rational Resurgence
With strands coming from many directions, major challenges to the irrationality findings came to a head in the mid-
1990s. One line of criticism attacked the experiments themselves: humans were not irrational, these experiments just
made them seem that way. Some researchers pointed out that the experimental stimuli in many studies were odd and un-
usual, and purposefully designed to trick people, who could get typical problems correct. Other researchers suggested
that experimental stimuli are often incomplete or ambiguous, and that experimenters make (incorrect) assumptions about
how subjects will fill in the missing information or interpret the ambiguous information. When complete information is
provided, people's reasoning is much more rational. [FN23]
The emerging field of evolutionary psychology offered another line of criticism. Psychologists in that field argued
that because we know the human body is the product of evolution and has gone through dramatic adaptations over time,
we should also accept the idea that the human mind is the product of evolution and has gone through dramatic adapta-
tions over time. In the domain of cognitive psychology, they argued that the problems presented by researchers are cur-
rent inventions. People might be “bad” at them but they are better at the kinds of reasoning tasks that might have arisen
longer ago (giving evolution a chance to optimize performance). [FN24]
For example, although people are not good at a deductive reasoning task called the “Wason Selection Task” when it
involves reasoning about abstract entities, they are good at it when the cover story involves detecting cheaters. [FN25] In
addition, although people are quite bad at *129 reasoning using probabilities, they do better when numerical information
is presented as frequencies rather than probabilities. [FN26] Gigerenzer and colleagues forcefully argued that some very
simple heuristics would be very successful in the simpler environment of the Pleistocene Epoch, [FN27] and probably
evolved to deal with the problems presented in that environment. [FN28]
D. Dual Systems
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Another movement that emerged in the 1990s--not explicitly to deal with the problem of (ir)rationality although it
can speak to that problem--was the dual systems approach. Researchers in a variety of areas in cognitive and social psy-
chology realized that they could not *130 explain individual human decision making as if it were the product of one reas-
oning process. Rather, people sometimes made judgments slowly and other times quickly; sometimes consciously and
sometimes unconsciously; sometimes analytically and sometimes by intuition or emotion. Experiments with different
contents found different types of dichotomies in reasoning, and researchers began to see patterns. Perhaps human think-
ing could be thought of as involving two different systems: one quick, unconscious, based on intuition or emotion, and
evolutionarily older; the other slow, conscious, based on analytic thought, and evolutionarily more recent. [FN29] Al-
though some researchers are not content with this down-the-line dichotomous view, it has sparked much theorizing and
research in the last dozen years. In fact, Kahneman [FN30] now argues that many of the findings from the heuristics and
biases research program can be explained by the dual systems approach.
Note that the dual systems approach both grew out of and prompted the re-emergence of the unconscious--or at least
unconscious knowledge and learning-- as a proper object of study. [FN31]
E. Affect as Information
Another type of processing that became a hot topic of study was emotion and affect. Believers in rationality often
characterized affect or emotion as something that could disturb or derail rational judgment. *131 However, a now-classic
study showed how a lack of emotion, rather than the presence of emotion, might actually lead to irrational decisions.
[FN32]
On a general level, affective feelings provide immediate information about whether something is good (a flower,
peace) or bad (a spider, war). When making these automatic evaluative judgments, people attend to their own feelings, as
if asking themselves: how do I feel about it? The experience of these felt evaluations serves as information. Thus, people
generally like what they feel good about, and dislike what they feel badly about. As a consequence, affective feelings
have been shown to influence ratings of life satisfaction, estimates of risk, attitudes and many other judgments. [FN33]
Affective cues, however, are informative not only when interpreted as evaluations of objects and situations. They can
also be interpreted as performance feedback when working on a task: positive feelings serve as success feedback and tell
us that our current cognitive strategy is adequate; negative feelings serve as failure feedback and tell us that a different
cognitive strategy should be pursued. As a result, being in a good mood makes people more likely to use heuristic pro-
cessing and to *132 interpret incoming information in relation to already known and easily accessible knowledge. In con-
trast, being in a bad mood makes people more likely to use analytical processing and to rely on basic perceptions--a sort
of “just the facts” approach. [FN34] Thus, contrary to early conceptions of affect, feelings appear to be an important
component of what might be considered adaptive or rational thought and behaviour.
F. (Re-)Considering the Brain
The 1990s also saw the rise of human cognitive neuroscience. Of course, how brains work has been a topic of interest
for a long time, but the development and refinement of new methods to examine the workings of alive, intact, function-
ing human brains led to an explosion of research. Three items are of particular importance for our purposes.
1. Words describing certain actions activate areas of the brain associated with those actions. For example,
when one hears the word “hammer”, circuits of the primary motor cortex (a part of the brain that is active when
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actually using a hammer) also become active. [FN35]
2. Seeing other individuals performing an action not only activates visual areas of the brain, but also activ-
ates the same areas of motor cortex that would be involved had the perceiver been doing the action himself.
[FN36]
*133 3. Using novel tools of neuroscience, the new field of neuroeconomics examines what happens in the
brain when people make personal choices and decisions. [FN37]
G. The Road to Embodied Cognition
Thus, the last dozen or so years have been filled with reactions to the notion that humans are not rational, and psy-
chologists have embraced (or re-embraced) a wide view of what constitutes proper areas of inquiry. A particularly inter-
esting aspect of this “rational resurgence” is that it considers things previously thought of as irrational--like emotion and
the unconscious --as useful parts of human cognition rather than as processes that detract from rationality.
Embodied cognition touches all these movements. It explains human behaviour by pointing out that the mind is
“attached” not only to the brain but also to the body. People learn through the actions they produce in the world, and this
learning is instantiated in a brain that is wired to store information learned differently through different modalities. Judg-
ments that appear irrational might make sense when made by someone whose body is signaling relevant feedback about
its physical state. Affect provides valuable information about the environment and the body's state. The theory of embod-
ied cognition relies on evolutionary psychology in a deep way: it supposes not only that bodies evolved and minds have
evolved but also that there must have been co-evolution--that they must have evolved together. And neuroscience can
help researchers figure the connections between body, brain and mind.
H. The Road to and from Behavioural Law and Economics
These various ways of thinking about rationality are not only relevant to the history of psychology, but also to the
history of economics and law. Standard economic theory relies on the ideal rational decision maker--homo economicus--
who can make rational *134 decisions in spite of vast quantities or paucities of information. The law and economics
movement, which applies economic methods to the analysis of law, has been around since Adam Smith. Its current in-
carnation began in the early 1960s [FN38] and it is now a thriving area of scholarship in most law schools. Like standard
economic theory on which it relies, it assumes the rational human. [FN39]
Research from the classic irrationality studies began finding its way into economics journals as early as the late
1970s. [FN40] As more economists began thinking about behaviour in terms of the now irrational human, an approach
called Behavioural Economics developed. Probably by this route, the irrationality view filtered into law as Behavioral
Law and Economics in the mid- to late- 1990s, just as it was coming under serious attack in psychology. [FN41] Since
then, scores of law review articles have taken the irrationality view and applied it to law.
Some of the other recent “rational resurgence” movements in psychology are also represented in law. There are a lot
of evolutionary analyses of law, many articles applying dual process accounts to law, and the law has embraced (perhaps
too quickly) the promises of neuroscience. However, there is little to no acknowledgment of the embodied cognition
movement in current legal writing.
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III. Embodied Cognition
The embodied cognition approach proposes that the main purpose of the brain and the mind is to facilitate action in a
complex environment. [FN42] Thus, trying to understand the human mind by studying *135 highly sophisticated yet arti-
ficial cognitive skills, such as playing chess or solving problems of formal logic, is misguided. Because the goal of any
mental process is to guide specific actions in a specific context, thought processes do not lead to a mirror image of the
world, but rather to a partial snapshot of only the relevant information for a given action goal in a given context. A curi-
ous illustration of this can be seen in the phenomenon of “change blindness”, where people overlook blatantly bizarre as-
pects of a scene (such as a woman walking around in a gorilla outfit) when these aspects are unrelated to a current action
goal, such as monitoring a group of basketball players. [FN43]
Importantly, context or situational factors do not simply modify what action, and thus, what cognitive process is ap-
propriate, but rather they define the action. Consider the example of the frog's visual system. Frogs have several neurolo-
gically separate visual pathways, such as one pathway to detect prey, another to monitor predators, and yet another to
control visually guided locomotion. [FN44] Thus, frogs do not have a general-purpose visual system that responds differ-
ently depending on what input it receives; instead, the input (for example, prey versus predator), and the corresponding
action associated with the input (catching a fly versus escaping from a hawk) selects the process of visual perception.
Thus the goal of vision is not to see, but to control movements as a response to stimuli in the environment. [FN45] This
idea has led to research studying the interactions of vision and action, thus rejecting the notion that vision, and other
seemingly basic perceptual processes, are independent of higher-level cognitive processes. [FN46]
*136 A. Embodied Perception
In line with the claim that cognitive processes are action-driven, research has shown that perception is constrained by
a person's potential to carry out specific actions in a given context. For example, participants wearing heavy backpacks
judge distances to be farther, [FN47] and hills to be steeper [FN48] than participants who do not have a “weight on their
shoulders”. Similar overestimation effects occur after exercising heavily. [FN49] Further, fear associated with standing
on a wobbly skateboard facing downhill makes the hill slant appear more threatening and therefore more steep, compared
to how the same hill appears when standing on a stable surface. [FN50] Such studies suggest that perceptions of environ-
mental characteristics are not “objective”, but are the result of pragmatic and functional demands for specific actions em-
bedded in specific environments.
Recently, studies have also shown that psychosocial resources can moderate the perception of the physical world. For
example, social support changed perception such that a steep hill appeared less steep when a friend was physically
present (versus not present), or when participants thought of a supportive other (versus a neutral other or non-supportive
other). [FN51]
All of these studies--whether about physical resources or psychosocial resources--are based on the assumption that
perceptual processes depend on a person's resources in the context of navigating the environment. Thus, these studies
were conducted from an embodied *137 perspective, because the traditional cognitive model would not make different
predictions for a person standing in front of an actual hill, versus sitting at a computer and indicating their response using
keyboard presses.
Importantly, studies of embodied perception redefine what might be considered an accurate, or rational, response to
the questions of “how steep is the hill?” On the one hand, if the hill is actually 5 degrees in incline, any deviation from 5
degrees is incorrect. On the other hand, when wearing a backpack the hill becomes functionally steeper, and an answer of
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20 degrees might be a more useful and adaptive answer. [FN52] Overall, studies on embodied perception suggest that
even seemingly objective aspects of the physical environment, such as the distance to a target, or the steepness of an in-
cline, involve the subjective experience of the body that perceives the environment.
B. Embodiment in Affective Science
Bodily states affect not only perception but also people's feelings, attitudes, thoughts and memories. [FN53]
*138 (i) Embodied Cues in Affective Experience.
Affective experiences--emotions and moods [FN54]--can be influenced by the bodily state associated with an emo-
tion. Such bodily cues become information that is used to interpret affective cues. Many studies support the idea that
feeling states can be initiated, or at least modified, by changes in people's bodily activities. [FN55] Simply put, it is diffi-
cult to be angry when your face displays a smile. [FN56]
(a) Facial Expressions
People who put on facial expressions of various emotions report feeling the corresponding emotions. [FN57] In a typ-
ical experiment, *139 participants were told that facial muscle activity was being measured by electrodes while they
were contorting their faces to contract various muscles. On some trials participants pulled up the corners of the mouth, in
others they pulled the eyebrows down and together. Although they did not realize that they were actually producing
smiles or frowns, participants reported feelings consistent with the expressions. [FN58] Similarly, participants might be
asked to hold the end of a pen with either their teeth (facilitating a smile), or with their lips (preventing a smile). When
asked to rate the humorousness of cartoons, participants who were in the smile-facilitating condition rated the cartoons as
more humourous. [FN59]
Just as voluntarily producing a facial expression can invoke an emotional feeling, being unable to produce an expres-
sion can inhibit the feeling: individuals who are unable to smile because of facial neuromuscular disorders tend to suffer
from elevated levels of depression. [FN60] Further, when the muscles involved in frowning are temporarily paralyzed,
neural activation to angry expressions is reduced. [FN61]
*140 (b) Posture
Posture also influences how people feel, such that standing up tall makes people feel more confident and proud.
[FN62] Combinations of facial expressions and postures produce stronger effects on feelings than either one does alone.
[FN63] Furthermore, extended manipulations of expressive behaviour have been shown to lead to enduring effects on
emotions over time. [FN64] All this empirical evidence suggests that, in the language of self-perception theory, [FN65]
people “read” their emotional bodily behaviour and may experience their emotional behaviours as emotional feelings:
given an appropriate context, a smile is actually experienced as feeling happy, or a slumped posture actually as feeling
sad. In the language of embodied theory, when people “simulate” experiencing an emotion, they end up feeling the emo-
tion. [FN66]
(ii) Embodied Cues in Attitude Formation
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Embodied cues not only influence feelings, but also have been shown to provide information about the “goodness
versus badness” of the *141 stimulus (that is, the “attitude object”) including cartoons, [FN67] odours, [FN68] pens,
[FN69] and food and beverages. [FN70] For instance, Kraut [FN71] asked participants to smell twelve different odours,
ranging from very pleasant ones (for example, vanilla) to very unpleasant ones (for example, butyric acid). During the
first trial, participants were allowed to produce their natural facial expressions in response to the odours. Subsequently,
however, they were instructed to exhibit an expression that would convince another person that they were smelling either
a pleasant or an unpleasant odour. Participants' subsequent evaluations of the odours became more positive if they had to
act as if it were a pleasant smell, but became more negative if they had to act as if it were a disgusting smell.
(a) Nodding and Shaking Heads
Motor behaviours that are associated with agreement or disagreement also influence attitudes. Under the pretext of
testing headphones for comfort and sound quality, participants were told to produce a vertical head movement while
listening to a communication about increasing tuition fees at their university. This experimental manipulation resulted in
participants nodding their heads, as if in agreement with the message. Other participants were asked to produce a hori-
zontal head movement, resulting in head shaking. When asked to specify a dollar amount they would deem appropriate
for the tuition increase, participants who had been nodding their heads during the message listed higher amounts than
participants who had been shaking *142 their heads during the message. [FN72] Using the same kind of paradigm, a pen
was placed on the desk in front of participants who were told either to shake or nod their heads while listening to neutral
music over headphones. Subsequently they used the pen to fill out a questionnaire about the headphones. When parti-
cipants were later asked which they would prefer to receive as a gift, either the pen they had used or a different one,
those who had nodded their heads were more likely to select the pen they had used than those who had shaken their
heads. [FN73] Thus, the simple behaviour of agreement coloured participants' perception of the desirability of an other-
wise neutral object.
(b) Approach and Avoidance Behaviours
Cacioppo and colleagues developed the arm contraction paradigm to study how approach and avoidance behaviours
affect liking: participants place the palm of their hand against the bottom of a table and press lightly upward against its
surface. This results in arm flexion, an approach behaviour. Alternatively, participants place the palm of their hand
against the top surface of a table and press lightly downward. This results in arm extension, an avoidance behaviour.
Early studies had participants make those behaviours while looking at neutral Chinese ideographs. Arm flexion
(“pulling”) subsequently resulted in greater liking of those stimuli, whereas avoidance behaviour (“pushing”) resulted in
less liking. [FN74]
Other studies investigated the effect of approach and avoidance behaviours on attitudes toward specific objects. Ap-
proach behaviour resulted in greater liking and a better election prognosis for a political *143 party than avoidance beha-
viour. [FN75] Approach and avoidance cues can also affect consumer behaviour. For example, participants performed
arm flexion or arm extension behaviours with a bowl of cookies or a pitcher of orange juice in front of them. Participants
who were flexing their arm muscles ate almost three times as many cookies or drank more orange juice than participants
who were extending their arm muscles, suggesting that they experienced their behaviours as indicative of the desirability
of the food. [FN76]
(c) Other Bodily Feedback Processes
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With the gaining popularity of the embodied cognition approach, researchers have started looking creatively at all
kinds of bodily feedback processes. For example, because making a fist brings to mind the concept of power, men feel
more assertive when making a fist than when making a neutral gesture. [FN77] Participants holding a cup of hot coffee
judged a person as having a “warmer” personality and being more caring compared to participants holding a cup of iced
coffee. [FN78] Similarly, people report that being socially excluded and left out made them feel cold, and led to an in-
creased desire for warm beverages. [FN79] Even culturally learned hand gestures can influence judgment processes:
when extending one's middle finger in a notoriously rude manner, an ambiguous person is interpreted as more aggressive
and hostile. [FN80]
*144 (iii) Embodied Cues in Affective Information Processing
All of the studies reviewed above suggest that bodily expressions and movements can exert important influences on
the formation of attitudes. In addition, numerous studies have investigated how manipulating conditions of the human
body influences cognitive performance.
One of the earliest studies varied participants' posture as they learned and relearned nonsense syllables. When posture
was the same for both trials, participants were significantly better at relearning the stimuli, compared to when posture
was different. [FN81] These results are consistent with a number of “context-dependent” learning results, which show
that people perform better when physical, environmental or psychological conditions at learning match those conditions
at test. [FN82]
Compatibility effects of bodily cues and affective cues have been demonstrated in a variety of contexts. [FN83] After
nodding their heads while studying positive and negative words, participants recognized more positive words than after
shaking their heads while studying the words. [FN84] Positive stimuli are recalled more easily while performing an ap-
proach behaviour, whereas negative stimuli are recalled more easily while performing an avoidance behaviour. [FN85]
Further, participants are faster to categorize positive stimuli when pulling a lever toward themselves, whereas they are
faster to categorize negative stimuli when pushing a *145 lever away from themselves. [FN86] Even under the visual il-
lusion of approaching a stimulus, participants are faster at judging positive stimuli, whereas under the illusion of the
stimulus moving away, participants are faster at judging negative stimuli. [FN87] Finally, approach and avoidance beha-
viours also influence creative insight and problem solving. [FN88] These data suggest that engaging in behaviours that
are typical for approach and avoidance have an implicit connection to good and bad things, and this connection emerges
when the context provides objects and situations for which the affective cues become relevant. [FN89]
C. Embodied Moral Judgment
In addition to judgments of physical space, which in principle should be “objective” in that a given estimate or judg-
ment is either accurate or not, other judgments that do not seem to involve right or wrong answers might also be shaped
by embodied experiences. Theories of moral judgment have long emphasized reasoning and conscious thought while
minimizing the role of contextual influences, such as affective processes. However, recent work has found that emotions
can change a person's moral judgments. In one experiment, participants made moral judgments while experiencing ex-
traneous feelings of disgust (for example, caused by a bad odour, or because participants sat at a dirty desk). When they
then considered how wrong it was to not return a lost wallet or to falsify information on one's curriculum vitae, those ex-
periencing disgust found the transgressions to be more wrong compared to people in a neutral mood. [FN90] It appears
that when people experience a gut feeling of disgust in the presence of a moral *146 transgression, they are more likely
to view the transgression as disgusting and therefore wrong. The reverse effect occurs when participants feel clean: they
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experience a “clean conscience” when considering a moral transgression. After having thoughts of cleanliness activated,
or after washing their hands subsequent to experiencing disgust, participants found moral transgressions to be less wrong
than did those who had not been exposed to a cleanliness manipulation. [FN91] These findings suggest that deciding
whether something is right or wrong, a process with critical relevance in legal contexts, can be driven by intuitive pro-
cesses rather than deliberate reasoning. [FN92]
D. Embodied Agency
The question of whether I am actively performing an action, or whether I am simply doing what I am doing because
of external circumstances, has special relevance to the law. Perceiving one's own body in the world usually indicates
whether we can assume “authorship” over an action or not--if I have the physical sensation that I did something, I must
indeed have done it. Although most of the time it is easy enough to infer whether one was the causal factor behind an ac-
tion, psychologists have been able to trick people into believing that they are involved in an action. For example, in the
“rubber hand illusion”, participants place their hand out of view under a table, and an artificial rubber hand is placed on
the table directly above their own hand. Then both the participant's unseen hand and the rubber hand are stroked softly
with a brush. Soon enough participants report that they feel as if the rubber hand was their own hand, an experience that
could *147 be interpreted as a misplaced sense of ownership of the hand. [FN93] This phenomenon can be considered
similar to the phantom limb phenomenon, where an amputee perceives a lost limb as if it were still in its natural place. In
what could be considered nature's perverse sense of irony, while amputees do not benefit from being able to use their lost
arm or leg, it can still cause them severe physical pain. [FN94] Healthy participants can be fooled into thinking that an-
other person's arm movements are their own. [FN95] When such illusions are generated, people will insist they “feel it in
their bones or know it in their gut” [FN96] that they have caused a certain behaviour, especially when it was an action
that requires considerable effort. [FN97] This illusion of not being sure where one's own body starts and where it ends
can even be taken so far as to induce an out-of-body experience in people with the help of a three-dimensional computer-
generated image of one's body. [FN98]
Thus, certain types of physical experiences that are very “real” on a phenomenological level can in fact be illusions,
and can lead to incorrect attributions of agency. Similar effects involving people being highly confident in their memory
of experiences and actions are well-known *148 from people's eyewitness testimony; this has become a prime example
of misguided confidence in one's own phenomenological experience. [FN99]
E. Metaphors We Live By [FN100]
In addition to physical action and perception, even abstract language might have an embodied basis. For instance, the
basic spatial concept of verticality is grounded in the fact that human beings usually function in an upright position and
have a clear up-down orientation. Verticality is invoked when people consider good or bad feelings, and use expressions
such as “feeling up” or “feeling down.” Even the term “depression” evokes the idea that when people feel bad, they
might be physically pushed down, or de-pressed. This close match of physical states and mental concepts is very system-
atic because it reflects what is going on with the human body when feeling a certain emotion: an upright, relaxed posture
when happy versus a slumped, drooping posture when depressed. Thus, spatial metaphors relate abstract concepts, such
as feelings, with simple physical concepts, such as the perception of one's own body in space.
In fact, studies show that many of these bodily metaphors capture features of mental processing. For example, people
are faster to classify positive words as “good” when they are presented at the top of a computer screen (metaphorically,
up is good) and negative words as “bad” when they are presented in the down location. [FN101] People automatically as-
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sociate morality and vertical space of up and down (for example, being “high minded” versus “underhanded”). However,
verticality and good and bad are not mapped by people who show a general lack of moral concern (that is, psychopaths).
[FN102] Furthermore, people who feel “down” because of *149 an experience of failure perceive the horizon to be
lower, whereas participants who feel “up” because of a successful experience perceive the horizon to be higher. [FN103]
F. More Than Just Metaphor?
Some of the earliest work on embodied cognition came from cognitive linguistics [FN104] and involved embodied
metaphors. As reviewed above, experimental psychologists have accumulated a lot of data indicating that embodied
metaphors fundamentally penetrate even the most abstract kinds of thought: physical purity is indicative of moral purity,
being depressed is bad whereas being a high flyer is good; warmth indicates pleasant social relationships whereas being
excluded feels cold.
There are other metaphors we use in judgment and decision-making that rely on the physical--for example, we
“weigh” or “balance” our options. In fact, when people use a heavy clipboard when filling out a questionnaire they find
the issues under consideration to “carry more weight.” [FN105] If our perceptions, affect and moral judgments are groun-
ded in bodily states, perhaps other reasoning and decision-making processes are also grounded in such states, and per-
haps some of the metaphors we use to describe them can provide information about how we actually do them. And per-
haps these metaphors that we live by, judge by and decide by should be considered rational in the sense that they provide
useful and appropriate decisional input.
*150 IV. Embodied Cognition, Embodied Rationality and Some Speculations on Implications for Law
The germ of the idea for this article came from noticing that many of the new popular books on judgment and de-
cision-making, written by serious academic scholars, use analogies to perception of the physical world to illustrate their
points. For example, in order to explain context effects in decision making, Dan Ariely's book Predictably Irrational
[FN106] begins with an analogy to the famous Ebbinghaus illusion shown in Figure 1. Which of the black circles is lar-
ger? The one on the right certainly looks larger. [FN107] If you have a pair of scissors handy, feel free to cut out the
black circle on the left and move it over the one on the right (or vice versa). If you are less industrious, or less destruct-
ive, then just believe us--the two black circles are the same size.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
*151 Ariely uses this physical illustration of the importance of context as an analogy to the difficulties humans have
in making real decisions like choosing jobs and homes and mates. Consider, for example, the classic finding by Kahne-
man and Tversky. How likely would you be to drive 20 minutes across town to save $20 on an $80 digital camera? Com-
pare that to how likely you would be to drive across town to save $20 on an $800 television. Kahneman and Tversky
found that people were more likely to try to save the money on a cheaper item than on a more expensive one. [FN108] As
in the visual illusion: the subjective size of some objective thing ($20) changes depending on what it is compared to.
[FN109]
We believe that the metaphors people use for describing decisionmaking might be more than just metaphors. Perhaps
some of the same embodied processes are at work when judging which black circle is bigger and judging which job is
better. Thus, in this section we want to begin our speculation about whether the notion of embodied cognition can be use-
ful to legal analysis. Because we are moving from the domain of actions and affect (in the previous section) to the do-
main of judgments, we now call the theory “embodied rationality”.
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We divide this section into three parts: (1) judgments involving risk and time; (2) judgments and decisions for and
about oneself; and (3) judgments and decisions for and about others.
A. Judgments Involving Risk and Time
Two characteristics of decision-making that are common in the legal system are decisions involving risk and de-
cisions involving time. Decisions involving risk include decisions about insurance, investments, entrepreneurship and
whether to take the chance of doing something illegal--from things “everyone” does like speeding or cheating on taxes to
committing serious crimes. Decisions involving time also include *152 decisions about investments (like how much to
save now and whether to use loans or payday lending) and planning for the future. Some decisions involve both risk and
time: for example, a defendant's decision whether to take a plea or risk a longer sentence by going to trial.
(i) Small Risks
One of the long-standing puzzles in the study of judgment and decision making is people's infelicity with compre-
hending very small probabilities and thus misassessing risk. Humans routinely overestimate the probability of very un-
likely risks [FN110] and therefore behave in non-optimal ways to protect against them (for example, overinsure, believe
driving is safer than flying. [FN111]
What is risk like? Metaphorically it seems like risk is a thing--a scary thing. People want to see it or, more import-
antly, foresee it, avoid it, manage it, handle it and control it. Why are people overly sensitive to very small risks? Con-
sider Figure 2: are the two pairs of lines on the left the same or different distances from each other? What about the two
pairs of lines on the right? It's the Weber-Fechner Law at work: on the *153 left we can see a difference between small
differences; on the right we cannot. The human sensory system is very attuned to noticing the difference between nothing
and just-a-little-bit-of-something. Perhaps that sensitivity is analogous to humans' sensitivity to very small risks. [FN112]
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
(ii) Subjectivity of risk
Another interesting puzzle about risk is that different people perceive the same objective risks as subjectively highly
different. For example, Slovic and colleagues have shown that when asked to estimate risks, different types of people are
likely to estimate different types of events as more or less risky. In one study, people with low incomes, minorities and
women saw bigger risks in 19 possible risk sources than did white men. [FN113] Given the various findings described
above showing that people with fewer relevant resources (for example, a heavy backpack, tired, old, alone) perceive hills
as steeper, shouldn't we also expect people with fewer relevant resources to perceive risks as larger?
*154 (iii) Time
Time is another dimension about which people seem to make bad judgments. In particular, researchers note people's
overly steep temporal discounting--a willingness to accept smaller amounts today in exchange for giving up larger
amounts in a not-too-distant future. In addition, people often have long term goals--like saving money--that they fail to
implement in the short term--for example, by increasing pension contributions deducted from their paycheques.
What is time like? Metaphorically, time is like distance. The future is ahead; the past is behind; events move closer or
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farther away. A quality of real distance is that closer objects look bigger and we can see them in more detail; distant ob-
jects are smaller and fuzzier and often we have to make guesses about what they are. Conversely, when we see a small
object we often assume that it is small because it is further away. That assumption is the force driving the illusion in Fig-
ure 3. The non-parallel lines look as if they are receding into the distance; the top black bar therefore appears farther
away than the bottom black bar; the top bar should therefore look smaller; since it does not look smaller, we infer that it
must actually be larger than the bottom bar.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Construal level theory in psychology notes that sometimes people think about objects or events in more abstract ways
and sometimes in more concrete ways. Analogous to physical distance, when people think about temporally distant
events (for example, the course you will teach next year) they think more abstractly and have more high-level goals (for
example, you will learn a lot; it will be exciting); however, when *155 people think about temporally close events (for
example, the course you will begin teaching tomorrow) they have more concrete and detailed concerns (for example, how
will you finish the syllabus today). [FN114] Note that, just as in vision, this relation is bi-directional: when people are
told to focus on abstract rather than concrete features of an event, they evaluate that event as temporally more distant.
[FN115] Thus, perhaps, changing the level of abstraction of discourse could affect whether people will start to implement
their long term goals.
B. Judgments and Decisions For and A bout Oneself
Most of the decisions--legal or otherwise--that we make are for and about ourselves. We consult our own prefer-
ences, desires and values, and although we assume that they are personal, we also view them as rational--at a minimum,
we believe that they are stable and not influenced by random physical qualities or emotional states. Yet our decisions are
affected by such factors.
(i) Should we invest?
We often must decide whether to spend more time or money or effort in order to obtain a bigger gain (or avoid a big-
ger loss). An obvious analogy to the Weber-Fechner Law is the idea of decreasing marginal utility. Figure 4 shows the
prototypical subjective utility curve with an objective measure on the x-axis and subjective utility on the y-axis. Notice
that in the upper-right quadrant, an increase of 1 unit on the x-axis is worth less than 1 unit on the y-axis--and worth less
still the further up the x-axis you go. The shape of this curve is a foundation of the heuristics and biases approach--and it
can be used to explain some *156 human irrationalities. [FN116] We find the analogy interesting: just like our subjective
experience of weight or loudness, our sensitivity to the addition of units of intangibles (like money) decreases as more
units are added.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Whether and how people are sensitive to the properties of this curve in real life comes up frequently in debates about
taxes (for example, will increasing the marginal tax rate decrease work or investments?), incentives and bonuses, and
whether price differentials should be phrased as discounts or surcharges.
(ii) Are Our Goals within Reach?
We often must decide whether a hurdle is too high or a goal is “within reach”. For example, can we afford to buy a
house or start a family? Can we expand our present business? In Part III, we described *157 how physical and social re-
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sources can affect perceptions of hills. In addition, an individual's own body size may affect her judgments of physical
qualities such as size and distance. Might these features also affect metaphorical hurdles and goals?
We factor in our own reach when judging close distances. [FN117] Distance is not standardized: items that are within
our reach are treated as being over-close compared to items that are just out of reach. Thus, items at a distance of about
two feet seem closer to people who can reach them and further to people who cannot. When people are given an imple-
ment to allow them to reach further, the discontinuity in perceived distance now occurs farther away: items within reach
of the implement are treated as being over-close. Importantly, however, an identical physical environment can be per-
ceived differently depending on a person's goals and intentions. For example, only when participants intended to use the
tool did targets within reach look closer; this was not the case when participants were simply holding the tool without us-
ing it to reach. [FN118]
If the metaphors hold, perhaps the success of taller people is due (in part) to them believing they have longer
“reaches” and acting accordingly. [FN119] Further, findings that powerful individuals are more likely to initiate actions
to change their environment than powerless ones, [FN120] and that powerful individuals are more focused on action-
specific information, [FN121] suggest that knowing that one has power, and resources, has profound effects on thought
and action. In other words, having power literally implies the ability to act on the world, to the benefit or detriment of
oneself and others. Perhaps, therefore, groups *158 that might benefit from devoting more effort to pursuing distant goals
could be helped by programs that metaphorically extend their reach.
(iii) Should We Stick or Change?
We must often choose whether to stick with the status quo or change things. For example, we can change jobs or res-
idences, marry or divorce, or vote for the new candidate or proposition. It turns out that our moods may affect such de-
cisions. In typical endowment effect studies, people who have received an object (for example, a mug) want more money
to sell the mug than people are willing to pay to buy the mug. [FN122] However, when experimental participants watch a
movie that makes them feel sad, the effect is reversed: they are willing to pay more for a new mug and ask less for the
old. When they watch a movie that makes them feel disgusted, they are willing to pay less and receive less (with no dif-
ference between the amounts). The argument goes that sad people wish to change their circumstances--get rid of
something old or buy something new--whereas disgusted people wish to not have anything. [FN123]
Granted, a laboratory study using mugs is not the same as real world decisions involving houses, marriages or busi-
nesses. But, it is certainly possible that moods (or, more likely, chronic dispositions) would affect this type of decision-
making.
C. Judgments and Decisions For and A bout Others
Sometimes we must make legally relevant decisions for or about others. For example, we could be a medical proxy or
hold a power-of-attorney, or we could be on a jury deciding whether someone reasonably believed she was in imminent
danger or was still in the “heat of passion” [FN124] *159 when killing another person. There is often a disparity between
the judgments we make for and about ourselves and those we make for and about others. From an embodied perspective
that makes sense: in decision-making for ourselves we are gathering information from “inside”, such as our bodily cues,
from our introspections and from our knowledge of the circumstances; in decision-making for others those cues and that
knowledge will be different.
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People often make different kinds of causal attributions for their own actions than for the actions of others. The
“inside view” results in the fundamental attribution error--we make dispositional attributions about others (for example,
he didn't help her because he is mean) whereas we make situational attributions about ourselves (for example, I didn't
help her because I was in a rush). This effect may result from us having more information about our own circumstances.
[FN125]
Our ability to introspect about our own thoughts leads to various self-serving biases. We view ourselves as kinder
and gentler, smarter and more generous than others. [FN126] When participants were asked to predict, for example, how
much money they would give to a campus charity flower sale, they predicted that they themselves would give more than
the average other student. The actual amounts individuals donated were closer to those estimated for others than for those
estimated for themselves. People also view themselves as more independent thinkers than others and less likely to
“follow the crowd”. [FN127]
*160 (i) Using Perspective-taking
However, we are not always totally immersed in our own present thoughts and feelings; we can take different per-
spectives. One way to do so is to imagine ourselves in the future; when students were asked to make judgments about
their future selves (for example, how much of a disgusting liquid they would be willing to drink) those judgments were
similar to the judgments they made for others. [FN128] Another way is to imagine ourselves in the third person; parti-
cipants experienced an event and then reported on it either from their own perspective--just as they had seen it (“inside
view”)--or as if they were a third person watching the whole event from the outside, with themselves as a participant in
it. In their recollections, the two groups were likely to remember some different details and people reporting from the in-
side reported experiencing more emotion and their memories were coloured by that emotion. [FN129]
Both of those techniques are ways of getting ourselves outside of ourselves. But, of course, another way to make de-
cisions for others that might be similar to the ones we make for ourselves would be to try to imagine ourselves in the
“other person's shoes” or to imagine things “from their points of view”. Note the embodied metaphors. One might specu-
late that given the findings described above on “mirror neurons”, namely that observing an action in another individual
appears to activate brain areas involved in doing the action oneself--perhaps the only way to understand another person's
experience is to perform a motor simulation with one's own body. In other words, the only way to judge what choices or
decisions another person would make might be to simulate one's own response, and draw conclusions from that response.
*161 (ii) The Jury's Judgment
Of course, the quintessential legal judgment that people make about others is the judgment jurors make in the
courtroom when deciding whether someone is liable or guilty. The courtroom itself expresses some embodied metaphors-
-most noticeably that of the judge, representative of truth and justice, sitting higher than everyone else. Embodied ration-
ality suggests that jurors' judgments could depend on many extrinsic factors relating to how the jurors have been treated
or how they feel. For example, we have mentioned that when people feel disgust because they are in a dirty environment
they judge moral transgressions to be more wrong than if they are in a clean environment. [FN130] In addition, people
who have been engaged in synchronous activities (for example, walking in step) later show more cooperation with each
other than those who have not. [FN131] And people who have been engaged in an activity involving lots of self-control
show increased prejudice and stereotyping compared to people who have not. [FN132] All of these findings have implic-
ations for courtroom judgments because jurors may find themselves standing and sitting (or living) in unison, may have
to use a lot of self-control to pretend to be engaged in a process that they don't care about or stop themselves from be-
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coming overly involved in one they care too much about, and may experience better or worse conditions as they make
such judgments (for example, in the courtroom, the bathroom, the juryroom). Whether such factors would affect legal
judgments remains an empirical question.
*162 V. Ending and Beginning
We have attempted to situate the new embodied cognition movement with respect to previous movements in psycho-
logy, law and economics. We argue that the “Reign of Heuristics and Biases”--the years when it was fashionable in psy-
chology to document new reasoning errors--is over, and that psychologists are now using a multitude of approaches to
help understand and explain human reasoning.
A question that we deliberately have not addressed is this: “what does it mean to be rational?” Certainly one defini-
tion of rationality (and the one we have been using) is “performing consistently with the formal rules of probability, logic
and statistics”; we agree that humans fail at that. But other definitions of rationality look to whether people perform op-
timally given the informational, temporal, cognitive, and other constraints under which they act. It is also possible to
view rationality in relation to the achievement of goals. Yet one more way of considering whether a cognitive process
might be rational is to determine whether it serves the purpose of adaptive action. As we discussed earlier, although
people verbally considerably overestimate hill slants, and those judgments might be considered highly inaccurate or irra-
tional, people are still perfectly capable of determining the right course of action when attempting to climb up the hill.
Actual behavior is appropriate despite the “incorrect” verbal report, or in fact, because of it, because the verbal overes-
timation reflects the intuition that the body will need certain resources when attempting the specific action.
We have also been asked whether we are not just substituting one label for “irrationality”--embodied cognition--for
another--heuristics and biases). The answer is: superficially yes but fundamentally no. The Reign of Heuristics and Bi-
ases generated a long list of people's deviations from the normatively rational. And the importation of that information
into Behavioural Law and Economics has promoted many thoughts about how to create environments in which such
“flawed” humans would make better decisions.
Embodied cognition research has also generated a list of people's deviations from the normatively rational. And it,
too, could promote *163 thoughts about how to create better decision environments. However, the heuristics and biases
approach lacked a unifying theory. How are the heuristics similar? Why do we have some biases rather than others? Sug-
gestions from theories of bounded rationality, evolution, emotion and dual processing have all been recruited to unify the
findings within the heuristics and biases framework. We believe that embodied rationality may do a better job. We note
that although theories of embodied cognition have stimulated intense research interest and theoretical debate, many re-
searchers following more traditional approaches remain critical. While we acknowledge the controversy of the general
notion of embodied cognition, the purpose of this paper is to outline its central tenets and to present some of its interest-
ing new findings in order to illustrate its potential relevance to law. [FN133]
Thus, our endeavor here is not to judge normative rationality, but to understand what influences people's judgment
and decision-making. We believe that theory and findings from embodied cognition can help us better understand how
intelligent and unimpaired human reasoners are likely to behave across a variety of important and legally relevant situ-
ations.
*164 Appendix
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Table 1: A timeline of developments in psychology
Psychology Movements Psychological Perspect-
ives for Studying Mind
Psychology as Related
to Law and Economics
19th century Physiological Psychology Measure physical judg-
ments, speed of decisions
1890s Introspectionism Introspection, basic ele-
ments of thought
1910s - 1960s Behaviorism Black Box
1950s - 1960s Cognitivism Rational Man
1970s Cognitive Science; Com-
puter Metaphor of Mind
Classic Irrationality Find-
ings
Current Law & Econom-
ics (L&E)
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tion
Mind, brain, body, envir-
onment
[FNa1]. Professor of Psychology and Professor of Law University of Virginia and University Lecturer University of
Cambridge, respectively. The authors wish to thank Claire Hill and the University of Minnesota Institute for Law and
Rationality for running an excellent conference on Emerging Paradigms of Rationality where these ideas were first
presented by BAS. We appreciate the many helpful comments we received from participants in the University of Virginia
School of Law Faculty Workshop Series. This paper also benefited from useful conversations with: Larry Barsalou, Jerry
Clore, John Darley, Art Glenberg, Jon Haidt, Reid Hastie, Denny Proffitt, Paul Slovic and Dan Wegner.
[FN1]. See the classic collection on human “irrationality”: Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds., Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and the classic work
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summarizing that research: Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judg-
ments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980). For the importation of these ideas into behavioral law and economics, see
the collection of articles in Cass R. Sunstein, ed., Behavioral Law & Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000). Of course, there are other definitions of what it means to be rational. As Keys and Schwartz note: “... the
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